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SEARCHES BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS: THE
DIMINISHING FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
The right of school officials to conduct searches for prohib-
ited items in the possession of students is a contemporary issue
of particular concern to parents, school administrators, law en-
forcement officers, attorneys, and, of course, students.'
This comment, which is based upon In re Fred C.2 and three
other recent California casess examines the trends established
by a line of cases pertaining to searches conducted by school offi-
cials. Three major doctrines for justifying the actions of adminis-
trators who undertake searches on school premises are considered.
These are: 1) the doctrine of in loco parentis, 2) the emergency
doctrine, and 3) the agency doctrine. Finally, a standard is sug-
gested to insure that the constitutional rights of juveniles are pro-
tected whenever school officials conduct a search of a student who
is suspected of possessing narcotics, especially when administra-
tors solicit the assistance of a police officer to help with the in-
vestigation.
BACKGROUND-SIGNIFICANT PRIOR CASES IN CALIFORNIA
AND IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Within the past few years, four California cases-one involv-
ing a search and seizure by police and credit card agents and
the others concerning searches by school officials which resulted
in the discovery of drugs-have provided a background for In
re Fred C.
Although not involving a juvenile suspect, Stapleton v. Su-
perior Court4 concerned the warrantless search of an auto by po-
lice and credit card agents. Because the search of the defendant's
automobile was clearly part of a joint operation by police and
credit card agents, the official police participation in planning
1. For a general discussion of criminal investigations in the schools see
Knowles, Criminal Investigation in the School: Its Constitutional Dimensions, 4
J. F. . LAW 151-74 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Knowles].
2. 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972).
3. People v. Lanthier, 5 Cal. 3d 751, 488 P.2d 625, 97 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1971); In re Thomas G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970);
In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
4. 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968).
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and implementing the investigation was held to constitute suffi-
cient state action to render the evidence inadmissible.5
This case emphasized the distinction between a search con-
ducted by a private citizen, to whom the fourth and fourteenth
amendments do not apply," and a search conducted by the police,
which constitutes state action and renders constitutional protec-
tions applicable.7  Furthermore, the Stapleton holding is readily
extended to the school cases: if the search is conducted by a
school official acting as a private citizen, the fourth amendment
protections are not applicable; however, if there is sufficient police
involvement to constitute state action, the student should be en-
titled to constitutional protection.
In re Donaldson-The Foundation for the In Loco Parentis Doc-
trine
In re Donaldson' is the first of three recent California cases
with fact situations similar to, but distinguishable from, In re Fred
C. In Donaldson, a student informant identified the defendant
to school administrators as the seller of methadrine pills. To se-
cure evidence of student misconduct, the vice principal of the high
school made a search without warrant or consent of the minor's
school locker and discovered marijuana.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the school adminis-
trator is a government official within the meaning of the fourth
5. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), held that the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Subsequently, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), held that evidence which is obtained by procedures that violate the
fourth amendment is inadmissible in state courts. The holding of Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), that the fourth amendment does not apply to
searches by private individuals was not disturbed by Mapp.
6. An unlawful search and seizure by a private person not employed by or
associated with a government unit is not a violation of constitutional guarantees
and evidence so obtained is admissible. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921) (incriminating papers discovered in private office of company employee);
Miramontes v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. App. 3d 877, 102 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1972)
(airline agents discovered marijuana in footlocker shipped via air freight); People
v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1000 (1964) (store detective observed theft of merchandise from retail
store dressing room); People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468
(1957) (employer discovered stolen merchandise in employee's car). See, Note,
Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REV.
608-18 (1967).
7. In People v. Fierro, 236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1965), a
motel manager acting under the direction of a sheriff's officer entered a guest's
room and took powder-filled rubber balloons and a sample of white powder
which was determined to be heroin. The court held the evidence inadmissible
because the manager acted as the emissary of the sheriff's office.
8. 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
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amendment. The prosecution argued that the vice principal
stands in loco parentis,9 has joint control over the locker, and
is a private person to whom the fourth amendment has no appli-
cation. The Donaldson court found no joint operation by
police and school officials' ° and held that the vice principal
was not a government official within the meaning of the fourth
amendment and that the search conducted for the purpose of se-
curing evidence of student misconduct was not unreasonable."
The court also held that the school stands in loco parentis and
concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting into evi-
dence the marijuana discovered by the vice principal.' 2 Because
the vice principal was acting as a private citizen, not as the agent
of a state or other government unit, the evidence was deemed
properly admissible. 13
Although Donaldson is a foundation case for justifying
searches conducted by school officials who act as private citizens
and who stand in loco parentis, the holding of this case appears
to provide weak reasoning for the precedent. The opinion does
include references to cases which support the argument that the
vice principal acted as a private citizen to whom the fourth
amendment does not apply; 14 however, the court does not rely
9. In loco parentis suggests that the school official is acting, literally, in the
place of the parent. See Annot. 443 A.L.R.2d 473, 474 (1972), 79 C.J.S. Control
of Pupils and Discipline § 493 (1952). Knowles, supra note 1, at 152 n.1, states:
Actually the phrase in loco parentis expresses nothing save that the
school has certain rights and duties to children in its care. When a
court rules that a certain act by a school official is performed in loco
parentis the court is actually concluding that the act was permissible.
When a court rules that an official superseded his powers in loco
parentis, the court is ruling that the specific act was not legally per-
missible. Most simply, the phrase in loco parentis is no guide to ac-
tion, but solely a conclusionary label attached to permissible school
controls.
10. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
11. The Donaldson court stated:
Such school official is one of the school authorities with an obligation
to maintain discipline in the interest of a proper and orderly school
operation, and the primary purpose of the school official's search was
not to obtain convictions, but to secure evidence of student misconduct.
That evidence of crime is uncovered and prosecution results therefrom
should not of itself make the search and seizure unreasonable. Id. at
511-12, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
Accord, People v. Chilton, 239 Cal. App. 2d 329, 48 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1966)
(search or arrest which is objectively justified on one ground is valid even though
other objectives may have been improper).
12. Following the reasoning of Donaldson, a recent decision noted that
school officials who stand in the place of parents do exercise considerable re-
sponsibility and control over their students but recognized that, at times, the
power and responsibility granted to school authorities under the doctrine of in
loco parentis will apparently conflict with fourth amendment guarantees. In re
Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 780-81, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775, 777 (1973).
13. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 511-12, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
14. People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65, cert. de-
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on any prior cases to support its holding that, because a school
official stands in loco parentis, his shared parental right to obtain
obedience extends to a search of the student's locker. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that the Donaldson decision was rendered
by the court of appeal and that three justices dissented when the
California Supreme Court denied a hearing.15
Texas took a stand similar to the Donaldson court in Mercer
v. Texas,"8 holding that a principal of a high school who de-
manded that the juvenile student disclose the contents of his pock-
ets was acting in loco parentis and not as an arm of government.
In Mercer, the dean of boys of the high school which the defend-
ant attended received a tip from an informer that a student was
in possession of marijuana. The principal called the student to
his office, directed him to empty his pockets, and told him that
his father would be called if he refused to comply with the re-
quest.' 7 When the student emptied his pockets, marijuana was
discovered. The principal called the youth's father and then the
police. The Mercer court implicitly relied on Donaldson to sup-
port its holding that because the principal was acting in loco pa-
rentis there was no violation of the student's fourth amendment
rights.'
In a lengthy and impressive dissent, Justice Hughes argued
that the Mercer holding extended the doctrine of in loco parentis
to unconstitutional proportions.1" He agreed with statements in
the opinion concerning the legal doctrine of in loco parentis but
argued that the majority opinion did not follow the authorities
espousing the doctrine.20 Justice Hughes noted that the Donald-
son case furnished only weak support for the Mercer court's hold-
ing that the principal was acting in loco parentis. In contrast,
he mentioned that the public schools of Texas were created and
function under a constitutional mandate and referred to Texas
nied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1963); People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d
468 (1957).
15. Traynor, C.J., Peters and Tobriner, J.J., dissented.
16. 450 S.W.2d 715 (1970) cited in Note, Search and Seizure: Is the
School Official a Policeman or Parent?, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 554 (1970).
17. C.f. Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 87 Cal. Rptr.
876 (1970) (father's consent constituted sufficient authorization for a police
search of his son's room, in spite of the son's objections).
18. 450 S.W.2d at 717 and 719. The court noted that unreasonable seizure
undertaken through governmental action is forbidden by the fourth amendment
but that constitutional protections are not violated by acts of individuals in
which the government has no part. The court determined that when the prin-
cipal demanded that the student disclose the contents of his pockets, he was
acting not as an arm of the government but rather in loco parentis.
19. id. at 718-22.
20. The majority cited: 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 453; RESTATE-




statutory provisions governing school employees to support his ar-
gument that the principal was acting within the scope of his duties
as an employee of the state. 2 Justice Hughes acknowledged that
school authorities may use powers of control, restraint, and correc-
tion over pupils as may be reasonably necessary to enable them
to perform their duties and to effect the general purpose of the
educational system, but he believed that the Mercer investigation
was a valid administrative search for school purposes only.
To refute the in loco parentis justification for the holding
in Mercer, Justice Hughes stressed that the parents of students
transferred only limited rights to public school authorities. If the
student's parents had conducted a search similar to the one under-
taken by the school administrators, they could have remained silent
regarding the results of the search without incurring criminal lia-
bility, a right or privilege which the principal did not legally have.
Although the parental right and privilege of determining whether
evidence incriminating the child should be suppressed or used to
deprive him of his liberty for a period of years could not be trans-
ferred to school authorities, Justice Hughes implied that the search
might have been justified on other grounds. He concluded, how-
ever, that the holding of the Mercer majority expanded the doc-
trine of in loco parentis to unconstitutional dimensions.22
In re Thomas G.
In In re Thomas G.,23 another recent California case, a class-
mate reported to the high school dean of students that the defendant
had taken a restricted dangerous drug and was possibly intoxicated
in class. The dean and principal went to the classroom and asked
the defendant to return with them to the dean's office. At the re-
quest of the principal, Thomas emptied his pockets. The contents
included a film canister which, when opened by the dean, was found
to contain amphetamine pills. The police were then called to the
school, and juvenile court proceedings were initiated.2 4
The court considered three options available to the dean of
students: 1) make a citizen's arrest or call a peace officer for
that purpose, 2) ignore the problem, or 3) conduct an informal
investigation. The third alternative was considered best by the
majority because this course of action avoided a disruption of
school activities and discipline and insured a minimum adverse
effect on the well-being of the student involved. 25  The court con-
21. 450 S.W.2d at 720.
22. Id. at 721-22.
23. 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970).
24. Id. at 1195, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
25. Id. at 1196-97, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
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cluded that the conduct of the dean and principal "was reasonable
and without Fourth Amendment taint"26 and noted that a conten-
tion that the high school administrators were engaged in joint ac-
tivity with a police officer in conducting the search was unsup-
ported by the evidence.
In a similar case in New York, People v. Stewart,28 a high
school dean of boys received information from student informers
that the defendant was in possession of narcotics, called the de-
fendant to his office, directed him to empty his pockets, and dis-
covered narcotic drugs. The dean immediately summoned a city
policeman who arrested the youth and escorted him to the pre-
cinct. Claiming a violation of fourth amendment rights, the de-
fendant attempted to suppress the introduction of the narcotics
into evidence. The sole question was whether fourth amendment
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures were ap-
plicable to private persons who obtain evidence for criminal prose-
cutions.29
In Stewart, the court noted that there was no "joint venture"
between the dean and the police to assist a criminal prosecution
and that, consequently, the dean was not a law enforcement offi-
cial but rather an educator responsible for the safety and welfare.
of the students at the school.30 The court further emphasized
26. Id. at 1199, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 364. To emphasize that fourth amendment
protections are more restricted when applied to minors than when applied to
adults, the court cited Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), in which the
Court determined that the power of the State to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of authority over adults and that people, including
teachers, who are responsible for the well-being of children, are entitled to legal
support to aid in discharging their duties.
The court in Thomas G. further cited Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944), which also recognized the state interest in protecting the welfare of
children by upholding a statute prohibiting minors from selling religious periodi-
cals. Support for the view of the Thomas G. court is found in several other
cases: In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969), con-
firmed the right of school authorities to conduct searches and seizures; Myers v.
Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969),
which was an action to compel reinstatement of a minor high school student
suspended for violating dress policy, permitted school authorities to impose more
stringent regulations on the constitutional rights of minors by holding that the
school board could validly require the student to wear his hair at a shorter
length; Akin v. Board of Educ. of Riverside Unified School Dist., 262 Cal. App.
2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968), held that the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of authority over adults and that
the imposition of reasonable restrictions or limits on the conduct of secondary
students is permissible.
27. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 1197-99, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
28. 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1970).
29. Id. at 603, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
30. Id. at 603, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 256. The court cited Stapleton v. Su-
perior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1969), in support
of its holding. See discussion pp. 118-19, supra.
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that, when a school official acts in the capacity of a private citizen
without the involvement of police authorities, there is no viola-
tion of the rights of the defendant under the fourth amend-
ment.3 '
The holdings in Thomas G. and Stewart further develop a
trend toward viewing the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures as inapplicable to school offi-
cials when conducting searches on school premises, so long as po-
lice involvement occurs subsequent to the search.
Lanthier and Boykin-The Emergency Doctrine
In People v. Lanthier,3 2 in response to a complaint of a
noxious odor emanating from somewhere in the study hall of a
private university library, the supervisor of maintenance services
and security guards conducted a warrantless search of defendant's
locker. Inside the locker the supervisor discovered a briefcase
containing numerous packets of material later determined to be
marijuana. In an attempt to identify the contents of the briefcase,
university officials secured professional advice by contacting the
campus and local police.
Although routine administrative searches of private property
for violations of local health or safety codes must be made with
a warrant, the court recognized that under emergency circum-
stances of "compelling urgency," a warrantless search based on
a citizen complaint was also reasonable.3 3  In addition, the court
31. Id. at 605, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 257. The Stewart court noted that, whenever
evidence is seized by a private person, without the knowledge or participation of
any governmental agency, it is admissible in a criminal prosecution; however, if
there is shown some involvement by a police agent who assisted in obtaining the
evidence, such evidence is excluded.
32. 5 Cal. 3d 751, 488 P.2d 625, 97 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1971).
33. Id. at 755, 488 P.2d at 628, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 300. The Lanthier court
cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) in which the Court
held that routine administrative searches of private property for violations of local
health or safety codes must be made with a warrant. However, the Court also
indicated that dangerous conditions must be prevented or abated and recognized
that the law has traditionally upheld prompt inspections, even without a war-
rant, in emergency situations. See e.g., North American Cold Storage Co. v.
City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Com-
pagnie Fran~aise de Navigation Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186
U.S. 380 (1902) (health quarantine).
People v. Howard, 21 Cal. App. 3d 997, 99 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1971), held that
a search by airline freight agents of packages which emitted an unusual sweet
odor and the subsequent discovery of marijuana was reasonable under an emer-
gency situation. The court reasoned that, although as a common carrier the
airline had a duty to transport the goods, carrying the packages with knowledge
of their contraband contents would have constituted both a federal and state
crime.
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held that after the initial search, the action of the university offi-
cials in enlisting police assistance to identify the substance which
they had discovered was also reasonable.3 4
In an Illinois case, In re Boykin, 5 the assistant principal of
a high school received a tip from an anonymous informant. How-
ever, in this instance, the informant indicated that the defendant
was carrying a concealed weapon, not narcotics. The administra-
tor sent for two police officers who accompanied him to a class-
room. The student was brought into the hall where one of the
officers removed a gun from his pants pocket.
The court ruled that, because of the nature of the potential
danger from a concealed weapon, which differs from the danger
in a narcotics case, the immediate search of the student by the
police officer was reasonable and the evidence was admissible. 8
Although both Lanthier and Boykin relied on the same
theory, the "emergency doctrine," it is obvious that the courts
in these cases did not view the question of exigent circumstances
in the same manner. Lanthier, involving a search for narcotics,
did not present the same type of emergency situation as Boykin,
where the potential danger from a concealed weapon provided
a more compelling reason and stronger justification for reliance
on the emergency doctrine.
BACKGROUND SUMMARY
The holdings in a series of recent California cases have de-
veloped important concepts pertaining to searches conducted by
school officials. Stapleton v. Superior Court3" emphasized the dis-
tinction between a search conducted by a private citizen and one
conducted by the police which thus constitutes official state action.
In re Donaldson,38 which followed Stapleton, determined that a
school official acted as a private citizen in conducting such a search.
Moreover, the search was justified by the court under the doctrine of
in loco parentis. In re Thomas G.3 9 represented the continuing
development of a trend which indicates that fourth amendment
34. 5 Cal. 3d at 757, 488 P.2d at 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 301. Compare
Lanthier with People v. Burke, 61 Cal. 2d 575, 394 P.2d 67, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1964), which emphasized that, where no emergency exists, compelling reasons
and exceptional circumstances must justify a search in the absence of a warrant.
For a discussion of the right of private university officials to conduct
searches, see Note, Admissibility of Evidence Seized by Private University Offi-
cials in Violation of Fourth Amendment Standards, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 507
(1971).
35. 39 Ill. 2d 617. 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968).
36. Id. at 619, 237 N.E.2d at 462.
37. 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968).
38. 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
39. 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970).
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constitutional protections do not apply to searches conducted by
school officials. The emergency doctrine provided justification
for a search by school officials in People v. Lanthier4 0 This line
of cases creates a setting for In re Fred C.,41 in which a police
officer participated in the search while acting as the agent of
school administrators.
IN RE FRED C.
In re Fred C.42 concerns a search of a high school student,
the discovery of dangerous drugs and marijuana in his possession,
and his subsequent arrest on multiple charges related to drug pos-
session. On January 19, 1971, Fred C., a seventeen-year-old
minor who had been expelled from one of his regular high school
classes, was required to spend a morning period in the outer office
of the vice principal of the school which he attended. On that
date, an unidentified third party informed a school official that
Fred had been selling dangerous drugs and narcotics on the cam-
pus earlier in the morning. Relying on this information, two vice
principals questioned Fred about the contents of his bulging levi
pockets and of a pouch which was tied to his belt. Fred revealed
the monetary contents of the pouch, about twenty dollars, but
refused to reveal the contents of his bulging pockets. Conse-
quently, the vice principals requested the services of a police offi-
cer.
A juvenile officer responded to the call and assisted the
school officials in conducting a search of Fred's pockets, which
revealed dangerous drugs and marijuana packaged in the manner
in which such drugs are generally sold. Subsequently, Fred was
arrested on charges of possession of a restricted dangerous drug
for the purpose of sale, possession of marijuana, and possession
of a restricted dangerous drug.43
The major questions raised in In re Fred C. were whether
school officials were authorized to conduct the search and to so-
licit police assistance in carrying out the investigation, and
40. 5 Cal. 3d 751, 488 P.2d 625, 97 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1971).
41. 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972).
42. Id.
43. Following the arrest of Fred C., a petition for wardship pursuant to the
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 was filed in the Juvenile Department of the
Superior Court of San Diego County. In March 1971, an order of the Superior
Court of San Diego County declared Fred a ward of the juvenile court. A re-
quest for a rehearing was denied, and the minor appealed the judgment and order
denying a rehearing. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth
Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the Order of the Superior Court of
San Diego County declaring the defendant to be a ward of the juvenile court.
A petition for hearing in the California Supreme Court was denied in August
1972.
[Vol. 14
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whether the search violated the constitutional guarantee against un-
reasonable search and seizure.44 The court answered both ques-
tions affirmatively. 4
5
In California, as well as in other states, earlier cases have
been based on similar fact situations: an informant's tip, a search
conducted by a school official, the discovery of marijuana or other
dangerous drugs, and the subsequent arrest of the suspected stu-
dent. 46  In re Fred C. was different in that, although a police
officer was brought in and participated in the search, the court
held that the validity of the search need not be tested against con-
stitutional standards. Rather, it treated the search as if it had
been conducted by school officials alone and determined only
whether a search by them was reasonable.
JUSTIFYING SEARCHES: RATIONALES FOR REASONABLENESS
Three major doctrines seem to have developed as justifica-
tions for criminal investigations in the schools: 1) the doctrine
of in loco parentis, which according to its literal interpretation
should strictly limit the school officials only to such courses of
action as parents would reasonably be expected to take under like
circumstances, usually without direct police involvement; 2) the
emergency doctrine, which permits school authorities to respond
to situations of "compelling urgency" by conducting an immediate
search, usually with the active participation of police officers; and
3) the agency doctrine, which allows school administrators to en-
list the assistance of police officers who act as their agents.
The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis
When student possession of prohibited items merely contra-
dicts reasonable school rules and regulations or constitutes evi-
dence of misconduct such as petty theft, the doctrine of in loco
parentis permits school officials to conduct a limited search, usu-
ally without police involvement. This doctrine, which is the basis
for the holdings in Donaldson and Mercer, considers that school
administrators are acting in the place of parents in conducting
the necessary investigation. As the dissenting judge in Mercer
argues, however, involving the police is an unreasonable extension
of the doctrine of in loco parentis because parents would not nor-
mally be expected to call the police automatically but would exer-
cise discretion in choosing whether or not to do so, even after
44. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
45. Id. at 325-26, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86.
46. See cases cited at note 3 supra; see also Mercer v. Texas, 450 S.W.2d 715
(1970) and People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1970).
1973]
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discovering that the minor was in possession of illegal drugs. 47
Suppose that the parents of a teenage boy were confronted
with circumstances similar to the fact situations in these cases.
Assume that other parents informed them that a group of teen-
agers, including their son, had been smoking pot and probably
hiding marijuana or other drugs in their homes. The parents
would owe some moral duty to the children involved to prevent
the continued use of drugs, but what would be the logical course
of action for the parents to follow? Would they thoroughly
search their son's room and, upon discovering a cache of drugs,
call the police so that juvenile proceedings could be initiated and
their son could be punished?
One might hope most parents would respect their son's pri-
vacy enough that they would not even attempt to search his room,
especially without his knowledge or consent. Ideally, they would
discuss the problem with their son, express their concern, and in-
dicate their desire to help him. Depending upon his reaction and
upon their relationship, they might question him about this possible
involvement. If they determined that the boy was in fact using
drugs, they might seek information on ways to overcome the prob-
lem and obtain medical treatment if necessary. However, the one
course of action which most parents probably would not follow
would be to enlist police assistance immediately to discipline their
child.4
Assuming that their information is reliable, school officials
should take disciplinary action whenever students are suspected
of possessing drugs on school premises. However, considering
that the phrase in loco parentis literally means "in the place
of parents," it would seem that any investigations justified under
this doctrine should be limited to actions which parents would
reasonably be expected to take under similar circumstances. In
the present line of cases, the term in loco parentis is merely a
convenient label utilized by the courts to indicate that the action
of the school officials was legally permissible.
When school officials conduct disciplinary investigations, es-
pecially those which could result in direct police involvement, why
47. 450 S.W.2d 715, 721 (1970).
48. In many cities, authorities have established community service units
through which they provide information about narcotics and assistance in iden-
tifying illegal drugs. For example, through the Analysis Anonymous Program
in Santa Clara County, parents may secure envelopes at drop out stations (lo-
cated at police departments, the sheriff's office, the health department, and other
similar places), deposit a sample of the drug in an envelope (which is identified
by a code number), and designate a telephone number at which they wish to re-
ceive a report of the analysis. The program also provides information on drug
problems, a referral service, and other forms of assistance. However, the pri-
mary purpose of the progam is to combat the use of drugs, not to punish the
possible offender.
[Vol. 14
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not recognize that they are acting strictly in their capacity as
school administrators and judge their actions accordingly? Such
recognition would avoid applying meaningless terminology sug-
gesting they are acting in the place of parents even when selecting
a course of action which most parents would not reasonably be
expected to follow-the one which would most likely result in
juvenile court proceedings being initiated against the minor.
As applied to In re Fred C., parents who suspect their child
of possessing narcotics would not be expected to enlist police as-
sistance in conducting a search. Therefore, the action of school
officials who enlist police assistance in making a disciplinary in-
vestigation should not be justified under the doctrine of in loco
parentis.
The Emergency Doctrine
When prohibited items constitute health and safety hazards
which threaten other students with harm or violence, the emer-
gency doctrine permits school officials to conduct an immediate
search, with or without direct police involvement, in response to
the "compelling urgency" of the circumstances. 49  Therefore, the
court in Lanthier determined that the search was reasonable be-
cause police assistance was enlisted in response to an urgent need
to discover the exact nature of the evidence found in the student's
locker. Likewise, in Boykin the potential threat of violence and
harm to investigating school officials and to other students justi-
fied the warrantless search conducted by police officers.
Under true emergency circumstances, such as a threat from
a concealed weapon, public policy should support and encourage
school officials to solicit the special services of trained police offi-
cers; and in fact, school authorities would no doubt have a duty
to enlist such assistance to protect the students for whose safety
and well-being they are responsible. However, although the
searches in both Lanthier and Boykin were justified by the courts
under the emergency doctrine, an important distinction should be
noted between narcotics and a concealed weapon as sources of
potential danger to other students. The material in the briefcase
might have constituted a health hazard, but the degree of potential
danger was clearly less significant in Lanthier than in Boykin.
In Lanthier, the court stressed that the citizen complaint just-
49. As suggested in People v. Lanthier, 5 Cal. 3d 751, 488 P.2d 625, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (1971), under circumstances of "compelling urgency," a citizen com-
plaint concerning a malodorous odor which may constitute a health hazard pro-
vides a satisfactory reason for initiating an immediate search. The complaint
also sustains the burden of proof showing that the search was conducted within
the emergency exception to warrant requirements.
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ified the action taken by school officials. Certainly, one might
expect school authorities to trace the odor and, after locating its
source, remove that source to another area. However, once the
odoriferous agent was found and isolated, one might question the
need for immediately involving the police and for opening the
briefcase before its owner might claim it. Would not an equally
effective course of action have been for the school officials to have
held the briefcase and contacted the owner to dispose of it or
at least to have questioned him concerning its contents before calling
the police?
The school officials in Lanthier might reasonably have been
expected to deal with the problem without prompt assistance from
authorities. In contrast, the need for immediate police involve-
ment seemed more justified in Boykin because school officials
were not properly trained to remove the gun from the possession
of the suspected student or to deal with the hazard involved.
While both cases concern police involvement under the emer-
gency doctrine, the rationale for enlisting police assistance is much
weaker in Lanthier, where the potential danger resulting from a
possible health hazard is questionable, than in Boykin, where the
potential danger from a concealed weapon posed a very real threat
to school officials and to other students.
The court in Fred C. cited Lanthier as the basis for its de-
termination that reasonableness is the controlling standard. It
also cited Lanthier to support the conclusion that the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches does not proscribe solici-
tation and use of professional assistance by school authorities in
conducting an authorized search for good cause;50 but the court
made no specific reference to the emergency doctrine as justifica-
tion for the search of Fred C.
Certainly the facts in Fred C. are not analogous to those
of Boykin where the potential danger from a concealed weapon
was clearly sufficient to justify police involvement in the initial
search. The emergency doctrine might be applied to the fact situ-
ation of Fred C. only if it were determined that the school
administrators had need to act quickly to protect other students
from the presence of illegal drugs at the school. If the principals
had believed that Fred was carrying a concealed weapon or that
he might have endangered other people, their appeal for assistance
might have been reasonable. One principal testified, however,
that he had no reason either to believe or not to believe that Fred
was carrying a weapon;51 and since the police officer who con-
50. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 326, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
51. Record at 10.
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ducted the search testified that he did not make a pat-down search
before reaching into Fred's pockets, 52 he apparently did not con-
sider the possibility of danger from a concealed weapon.
Because the record in Fred C. suggests that there was neither
an expectation of danger of such nature as to require the adminis-
trators to protect either themselves or other students nor provoca-
tion to search for anything other than illegal drugs, the search
of Fred C. cannot properly be justified under the emergency doc-
trine.
The Agency Doctrine
The circumstances for application of the agency doctrine are
presented by the fact situation of In re Fred C., where the school
officials requested police assistance in actually carrying out a
search. Although the opinion does not denominate the agency
doctrine as such, the court in Fred C. is the first to hold that
a police officer acted as the "agent" of school administrators.
While this rationale provides yet another basis for justifying police
involvement, the doctrine also poses many problems regarding the
permissible scope of the agency relationship.
In Fred C., the school administrators had a duty to ascertain
the truth of the information they received and to investigate any
suspicious circumstances.53  They were empowered to act under
52. Record at 20.
53. The prosecution argued that school authorities had the right to search
Fred in the discharge of their official duties. This position is supported by U.S.
v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (D.C. Me. 1969), in which evidence was admitted after
being obtained by the administrative officer of a job corps center who conducted
a search deemed to be a reasonable exercise of supervisory power. It is also
supported by Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F.
Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968), which upheld the iight of college officials to
enter and search a student's room without a warrant or consent. The validity of
the regulation authorizing the search was determined by whether the regulation
was a reasonable exercise of the college supervisor's authority and duty to main-
tain discipline and order or to maintain security.
The prosecution in Fred C. also contended that the juvenile officer had
probable cause to arrest the student for illegal possession of drugs and to search
his person incident to that arrest. Although the search was initiated and based
upon unverified information supplied by an unnamed informant, the court
held that the information plus the obvious bulge in the student's levi pocket con-
stituted sufficient probable cause for the search. The prosecution relied on
People v. Benjamin, 71 Cal. 2d 296, 303, 455 P.2d 438, 441-42, 78 Cal. Rptr.
510, 514 (1969), and People v. Garcia, 187 Cal. App. 2d 93, 9 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1960). Benjamin held that, although information provided by an informant
was insufficient alone to justify the issuance of a warrant, the combination of
the information with the officer's own observation did constitute sufficient prob-
able cause for issuance of a warrant. Garcia held that information gathered
by police from several independent sources plus the officer's surveillance of the
defendant constituted probable cause for arrest without a warrant.
But see People v. Reeves, 61 Cal. 2d 268, 391 P.2d 393, 38 Cal. Rptr. I
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education code provisions which grant them broad investigatory
powers, including the right to detain students upon school prem-
ises. 54  The court recognized that the school authorities had a
statutory duty to protect students from the misconduct of another
student engaged in selling dangerous drugs. Under the circum-
stances, the court observed, the principals had adequate provoca-
tion for conducting a search for dangerous drugs for such a search
was within the scope of their duties. 55
Whether school officials were authorized to delegate their du-
ties by soliciting the assistance of a police officer to conduct the
search was an open question. The prosecution argued that there
was no reason in logic or policy why the principal should not
be permitted to have another individual, including a police officer,
perform the task of searching for him, provided the scope of the
search by the agent did not exceed the scope of the search which
the school official himself could have conducted.56 The court
upheld this contention but did not provide a positive basis or ex-
planation as to why the principals should be permitted to dele-
gate their authority to the police officer!
If the school officials clearly had the right to delegate their
authority to conduct disciplinary investigations, perhaps school
standards based on education code provisions 7 should have con-
tinued to apply to the search. On the other hand, if it were deter-
mined that there was no proper basis for delegating administrative
authority and that such delegation could result in undesirable con-
sequences for the school, perhaps the school officials should not
have been permitted to make the delegation or external standards
should have been applied to judge the propriety and legality of
such conduct.
(1964), where evidence was not admissible because there were no reasonable
grounds for a search conducted by police who relied solely on the tip of an
anonymous informant, without sufficient corroboration.
54. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 301 (1969) requires that school officials
exercise careful supervision over the moral condition of the schools and spe-
cifically prohibits the use or possession of tobacco, intoxicating liquor or other
hallucinogenic or dangerous drugs or substances. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10603(a)
(West 1969) authorizes suspension of any student who has used, sold, or been
in possession of narcotics or other hallucinogenic drugs. CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 11701 (West 1969) charges school officials with a general duty to safeguard
the health and physical development of pupils.
55. As indicated in the dissenting opinion in Mercer v. Texas, 450 S.W.2d
715, 720 (1970), an alternative argument suggests that, since the disciplinary
power conferred upon school administrators is based on statutory provisions en-
acted by the state legislature, the school officials are in fact government officials.
Hence, their acts should be considered official state action subject to constitu-
tional protection.
56. Brief for Respondent at 9.
57. See note 54 supra.
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The juvenile officer testified that, although he was searching
for narcotics and intended to arrest the student if drugs were
found, he was conducting an investigation for school officials and
acting as their agent at the time he commenced the search of the
student's pockets.5" The court in Fred C. reasoned that since
the school officials had cause to undertake the search the juvenile
officer acting under school authority could also rightfully conduct
the search and that the assistance rendered by the officer acting
as the agent of the vice principals did not violate the constitu-
tional rights of the student.59
Under the circumstances of this case, it seems incongruous
for the court to have validated the contention that the detective
could act in a dual capacity: as a private citizen-agent of the
school officials for the purpose of culminating the search and also
as a police officer with the intent to effect an arrest upon discover-
ing illegal drugs.
In Mercer, Thomas G., and Stewart, the students apparently
gave coerced consent in response to the requests of school ad-
minstrators to empty their pockets. °0 The school officials acted
unaided in successfully conducting the necessary searches, and
they summoned police officers for the purpose of initiating juve-
nile proceedings only after contraband was discoverd. While the
investigations were being conducted by the principals, standards
for determining the reasonableness of the searches were based on
education code provisions concerning disciplinary actions; whereas,
once the police were involved in these cases, students were advised
of their rights and criminal standards and procedures were applied.
The circumstances of Fred C. were distinguishable from the
facts of the three prior cases because Fred refused to permit the
search of his pockets. One principal testified that since he did
not feel adequately trained to conduct a forcible search he re-
quested the assistance of a police officer who was better quali-
fied.0' When the school officials decided they were not qualified
to continue the necessary investigation and solicited police assist-
ance for the specific purpose of searching Fred's pockets, the cir-
58. In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 325, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685 (1972).
59. Id. at 324-25, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 684-85.
60. A student must give consent freely and knowingly in order to legalize
what otherwise would be an illegal search. Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Because of his subordinate position, a student might feel compelled to cooperate
with school officials; however such cooperation would not necessarily constitute
a waiver of the student's right to be secure from a search. See Knowles,
Criminal Investigation in the School: Its Constitutional Dimensions, 4 FAM. LAw
153-54 (1964).
61. In this case, even a forcible search conducted by the principals acting




cumstances of In re Fred C. changed significantly from the factual
situations of Mercer, Thomas G., and Stewart because the police
officer became involved prior to the actual discovery of narcotics.
In fact, the officer himself discovered them. The precedents of
these prior related cases suggest that, whenever school administra-
tors are unable to handle a disciplinary problem, the circum-
stances are no longer sufficiently within the scope of normal
school operations for education code provisions and standards to
apply. Instead, when outside assistance is required and the au-
thority of school administrators is transferred to any person who
is not an employee of the school district, external standards should
replace those used to judge the actions of school officials. The
cases also suggest that at whatever point in time a police officer
becomes involved in an investigation the character of the search
shifts from a school disciplinary inquiry to an official police inves-
tigation. However, cause to search will have already been estab-
lished under standards provided by the education code,6 2 and un-
der the decision in Fred C. entry of the police will not herald
a stricter standard.
Under the circumstances of In re Fred C., when the princi-
pals relinquished their authority and delegated their duties to the
police officer, whether prior or subsequent to the actual discovery
of illegal drugs, the standards for judging the reasonableness of
the search should have automatically shifted from educational
standards applied to school administrators to criminal standards
applied to the actions of police officers.
Once the police detective became involved in the search of
Fred C., the undertaking should have been considered a joint
venture between school officials and the police, so as to constitute
state action requiring the application of external standards and
constitutional protections. Adequate consideration should have
been given to the reliability of the information provided by the
informant,63 probable cause for search and arrest, 4 and constitu-
tional guarantees proscribing unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures.6 5  The outcome of the case might have been the same,
but the court should have avoided introducing the agency doctrine
as justification for searches actually conducted by a police offi-
cer.
In response to the unique fact situation of In re Fred C.,
62. See note 54 supra.
63. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967).
64. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the court introduced a rationale justifying the search as a proper
extension of school disciplinary authority. However, in conclud-
ing that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
does not proscribe solicitation and use of professional assistance
by school authorities in conducting an authorized search of a stu-
dent for good cause, the court established a dangerous precedent.
In effect, the ruling opens the proverbial Pandora's box, possibly
permitting school officials to delegate their administrative author-
ity and duties to a myriad of people who are not employees of
the school system.66 Although some such extensions would not
seem dangerous from a constitutional standpoint, the potential
dangers of increased use of police by school officials could seri-
ously erode fourth amendment rights while neatly avoiding a state
action designation.
SUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT CASES
A significant number of cases involving circumstances where
school administrators conduct searches for illegal drugs have come
before the courts within recent years. As suggested by the three
basic doctrines courts have enunciated to justify such searches,
there have been a variety of approaches concerning criminal inves-
tigations in the schools.
In most of the cases, police assistance and participation was
enlisted subsequent to the initial search. The holdings indicate
that the school authorities may utilize the information supplied by
student-informers as the basis for searching the suspected student's
locker or person and that they have the right and power to conduct
searches and seizures which might not be reasonable by external
standards.
Stapleton v. Superior Court67 emphasizes the distinction be-
tween a search conducted by a private citizen and a search con-
ducted by police. The three closely-related California cases of
Donaldson, Thomas G., and Lanthier establish that: 1) in con-
ducting searches on school premises, school officials act as private
citizens, not as public officials, 2) under the circumstances of
these cases, fourth and fourteenth amendment protections do not
66. The holding could readily be extended to permit school officials to dele-
gate their authority to a variety of specially-trained people, including physicians,
social workers, psychiatrists, and many other professionals, whose services could
be utilized to aid school administrators in carrying out their duties. Just as the
assistance of the police officer was justified in Fred C., the actions of other
specially qualified professionals could also be justified as "reasonable" extensions
of the broad administrative authority granted to school officials under education
code provisions.
67. 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968).
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apply; and 3) evidence discovered by school administrators is ad-
missible in court trials. 8
By permitting independent searches for narcotics by school
administrators acting as private persons and without the involve.
ment or assistance of police officials, Mercer and Stewart comple-
ment the holdings of the California cases. In Boykin, the one
exception where police were involved prior to the actual search,
the direct participation of police officers in searching the student
was upheld because of the important distinction between the na-
ture of the danger from a concealed weapon as compared with
the danger from narcotics.
In re Fred C. is distinctive because it is the first reported
case in California where police assistance was enlisted prior to
an initial search by school authorities when the student involved
was suspected of possessing narcotics. The juvenile officer, who
was deemed to be making the investigation for the school admin-
istrators and acting as the agent of the vice principals, was present
and actively assisted them before any drugs were actually discov-
ered.
The court concluded, nevertheless, that it was reasonable for
the vice principals to enlist the professional assistance of the police
officer in conducting an authorized search for good cause and
that the use of police services was not constitutionally prohibited
under the circumstances of the case.
The holding of In re Fred C. is important because it sug-
gests that the scope of authority granted to school officials as pri-
vate citizens includes the right to create an agency relationship
with police officers whose assistance they enlist in conducting
searches for narcotics. 9 In the view of this writer, this doctrine
substantially undercuts the vital (and guaranteed) rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and is plainly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
In determining the reasonableness of a search conducted un-
der the authority of school officials, it is necessary to balance the
scope of that authority against the student's right to constitutional
68. See discussion pp. 119-25 supra.
69. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 685. The fact situation
where the school official requests the assistance of a police officer should be
distinguished from one in which the police request the assistance of the school
administrator. When the police arrive at the school and request the assistance of
school officials, state action is more clearly evident and fourth amendment pro-
tections should apply. In fact, under these circumstances, the school official
would probably have a duty to protect the student against an unlawful police
investigation and to insure that the rights of the student were not violated
through a wrongful search and seizure.
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protection, 70 especially in light of the trend of recent cases toward
an increasing disregard for the student's right to such protection.
The holding of In re Fred C. establishes the right of school
officials to solicit police assistance in exercising the disciplinary
powers granted to them under education code provisions. To in-
sure the proper exercise of these powers by school administrators
and to provide adequate protection for the constitutional rights
of minor students, it is imperative that standards be established
for determining: 1) the exact scope of school authority which
should be extended to a police officer who is requested to act
for school officials in exercising their disciplinary powers over
students; 2) the extent of permissible police participation or in-
volvement in searching students while the officer acts as an agent
under the authority of school officials; and 3) the criteria or
guidelines necessary to indicate when police participation in such
searches is no longer within the proper scope of school author-
ity but in fact becomes official state action.
The holdings of recent cases concerning the investigation and
searches of students suspected of possessing illegal drugs lack
strong precedents and fail to present definitive standards for police
involvement. 71  When there is no compelling danger to justify po-
lice involvement under the emergency doctrine but the seriousness
of the offense is greater than that customarily associated with
searches under the doctrine of in loco parentis, there is a partic-
ularly critical need to delineate the permissible scope of delegation
of disciplinary authority.
The following standard is suggested: Whenever school offi-
cials enlist the assistance of a police officer to conduct a search
on school premises, calling the police should automatically convert
the investigation into a police action to which full constitutional
70. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), held that the Bill of Rights and four-
teenth amendment constitutional guarantees of due process, which include pro-
cedural safeguards such as notice of charges, right to counsel, and the privilege
against self-incrimination, apply to juvenile hearings. This holding suggests that
a minor has a constitutional right to be secure in his person from all unreason-
able searches and seizures. See also in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); but see
McKiever v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
71. As more cases dealing with, or related to, the factual situation of In re
Fred C. come before the courts, the holdings may be expected to define, clarify,
and limit the permissible extent of police involvement and participation, particu-
larly under the agency doctrine. See, e.g., In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App.
3d 777, 782, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (1973), in which the court established a
two-pronged test to determine whether the search of a locker by school officials
was reasonable: the search must be 1) within the scope of the school's duties
and 2) reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case. The court
noted that, although the doctrine of in loco parentis is applicable, the fourth




protections should apply. It is further suggested that the law re-
quire school officials to follow a procedure that would properly
safeguard the rights of students. This procedure would require
administrators to detain the student upon the school premises, re-
quest that the police obtain a proper warrant before conducting
a search, and impose practical safeguards such as inquiring
whether the student wished to call his parents (or perhaps even
a family attorney). Further, administrators should remain in the
presence of the student at all times, and determine if the student
is aware of the nature of the investigation and understands his
position and rights.
School officials are not normally qualified to offer advice on
legal questions; but whenever substantial doubt exists concerning
either the scope of properly delegated authority or the possibility
of infringing upon the rights of the students by conducting a
search, the primary concern of school officials should be to protect
the rights of the student. Any lesser concern makes the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment meaningless for a segment of the
population the Supreme Court has increasingly shown a desire
to protect.
Margaret A. Mulholland*
* The author wishes to thank Harley Kenneth Branson, attorney at law,
for his assistance in the selection and research of this comment.
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